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Abstract— With the emergence of ad hoc networking technology
came efforts to provide necessary security support for ad hoc
networks. However, due to challenging characteristics of ad hoc
environments, providing the same level of security as in wired
networks is often very difficult if not impossible. A more viable
way to approach this challenge is to maximize the utility of the
achievable security instead of trying to achieve perfect security
at a prohibitive cost. To this end, we propose a Situation-Aware
Security paradigm. A situation-aware security service provides
best-achievable service and the clients of the service constantly
measure the level of the currently provided service. We apply this
new paradigm to one of the most fundamental security services:
authentication. Most proposed solutions measure their utility using
only success ratio, which cannot fully measure the quality of the
authentication service and often leads to a false sense of security.
Therefore, we propose the missing part of the metric, the Quality
of Authentication (QoA). QoA encapsulates the current situation that
the authentication service operates in, which is expressed as the
level of confidence an authenticating entity can put on the target
entity. QoA combined with success ratio can provide a complete
evaluation of an authentication service. We evaluate existing ad hoc
key management frameworks with an extensive simulation study
and combinatorial analysis of the framework designs to show the
utility of QoA, including the discovery of previously hidden flaws of
existing designs and a comprehensive comparison between several
different approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile ad hoc networking has emerged as an enabling technol-
ogy to provide network support for environments where support
is either technically or financially infeasible. There are many
mission critical applications that can readily utilize the timely and
cost-effective network support of an ad hoc network, including
battlefield communication and emergency rescue operations. The
benefits from ad hoc networking for such mission critical appli-
cations can be enormous if the ad hoc networks can provide the
necessary security support to guarantee safe and reliable commu-
nication. However, due to challenging environmental conditions,
it is difficult and often impossible to provide the same level
of security support in ad hoc networks as expected in wired
networks.
Key management frameworks that provide authentication ser-
vices are a prime example of this disparity. While many ap-
proaches have been proposed, they either make strong assump-
tions or have prohibitive costs. For example, existing distributed
public key infrastructure (PKI) approaches either suffer from
inadequate security [11] or less than perfect availability [21] and
distributed certificate chaining approaches can only provide a
marginal level of confidence in the authentication service they
provide [4]. Even a hybrid approach specifically designed for
ad hoc networks shows degraded performance under challeng-
ing operating conditions [22]. These difficulties stem from the
challenging environmental factors of ad hoc networks. While
it is important to continue the efforts to provide the highest
level of security support, it is even more crucial to recognize
the drastic differences between wired networks and ad hoc
networks that can invalidate many assumptions of traditional
security service design. Ad hoc security service designers must
be able to approach the problem from outside the realm of
traditional security service design. If it is indeed infeasible or
too expensive to provide a wired-equivalent level of security in
ad hoc environments, a more viable and realistic approach is to
maximize the achievable level of security service and expose this
level to the end users. However, this type of approach requires
a change in our view on security. The traditional view of the
quality of security only has two discrete states {secure, insecure}.
This space must be changed to a new view with a spectrum of
continuous quality that may vary over time.
To enable this new approach to security in ad hoc networks,
we introduce the concept of “Situation”, which is the overall
information and knowledge about a security service. A situation
for a security service consists of two components: the design
of the specific security service and the end user’s knowledge
and observations about environmental factors that can affect the
quality of the provided service. The quality of the currently
provided service can now be measured based on this situational
information. The main challenges for providing situation-aware
security include: (1) designing security services to provide a best-
achievable security service and to expose the relevant information
about its design parameters, (2) identifying the relevant set
of situational information including the design parameters and
environmental effects, (3) designing a set of meaningful metrics
to calculate the quality of security and (4) designing an intuitive
way to convey the measured quality of security to end users
In this paper, we focus our attention on one specific security
service: authentication. For traditional infrastructure-based key
management approaches [8], the security and reliability of the
infrastructure are not questioned so there is no need to “measure”
the quality of security. For cooperative approaches like PGP [24],
only very simple models to measure the quality of security have
been proposed, none of which flourished due to the lack of
popularity of the system itself. However, the introduction of
these approaches into ad hoc environments resurrects the need
for accurate measurement due to the challenging operating con-
ditions of the ad hoc environment. Since the fundamental service
provided by a key management framework is authentication, the
quality of security that must be measured for key management
frameworks is the Quality of Authentication (QoA). In this paper,
we present a comprehensive framework to measure QoA based
on situational information. First, we identify a relevant set of
situational information, which we integrate into current trust
models to produce a complete and unified Trust Relationship
Graph (TRG) model. Second, we propose a comprehensive and
intuitive set of Metrics of Authentication (MoA) to calculate the
quality of authentication. We base the design of our MoA on
a well-established research area of philosophy called Scientific
Confirmation Theory, which is is the study of human reasoning.
More specifically, it captures how humans aggregate and combine
multiple and potentially conflicting pieces of evidence about a
single event. By adopting this method, our MoA closely mimics
human reasoning, resulting in an intuitive formula. Finally, we
evaluate existing key management frameworks showing that the
inclusion of situational information highlights the different QoA
provided by each framework.
In the rest of this paper, we first argue for the necessity of a
paradigm shift to situation-aware security in ad hoc environments
in Section II. Then, we survey the state of the art in ad hoc
key management approaches in Section III. In Section IV, we
present our trust relationship model. Section V describes a suite
of metrics to calculate the quality of authentication based on
the proposed trust relationship model. Then, in Section VI, we
apply this metric to existing ad hoc key management frameworks
and present performance evaluation results from an extensive
simulation study, and conclude in Section VII.
II. SITUATION-AWARE SECURITY IN AD HOC NETWORKS
Due to the rapidly changing operating conditions of ad hoc
networks, the situations that affect security services also change
frequently. The effects of such changes must be captured by
measuring the quality of the security service based on obser-
vations about the current situation. This idea of measuring the
quality of security is not new. There have been research efforts
focusing on operational security, where the operating conditions
of the system are constantly monitored from the system operator’s
view to maintain a high level of security service in the face
of malfunctions or attacks [13]. While these previous efforts
are either limited or have not received much attention in recent
years, the emergence of ad hoc networks, where uncertainty and
unpredictable behavior abound, warrants re-examining the idea
of measurable security.
The quality of security for ad hoc networks heavily depends on
the design of the security service and the environmental effects on
the service. These two factors determine the changing Situation
of an ad hoc security service. While the design parameters of
a security service must be provided by the security service, the
relevant environmental factors must be monitored by end users.
Traditionally, the main design goal of security services has
been to provide a perfect security service. For example, a firewall
is designed to block all unauthorized accesses and not some
portion of them. Likewise, an encryption algorithm is expected
to generate truly random-looking ciphertext and not somewhat
random output. If we visualize quality of security as a continuous
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spectrum with no security at one end and perfect security at
the other end, the traditional view is to consider the single
extreme point of perfect security, or a very narrow margin around
that single point, as the secure state (Figure 1). Designing a
security service to achieve this strict goal in any complex system
may be possible in theory, but almost impossible in reality
due to implementation limitations, environmental difficulties, or
the difficulty in managing the sheer complexity of the system.
There has recently been an attempt to address these problems by
designing systems to expect and tolerate minor malfunctions [16].
We believe this is the right direction to approaching security
challenges in any complex system.
However, in ad hoc environments, we propose to extend this
view even further so that a security service must be considered
as a service with changing quality over time (Figure 2). Instead
of treating faults and compromises as exceptions to handle, they
must be viewed as a part of the normal operating conditions
that affect the provided level of service. The consequences of
this change in view forces end users to change their perception
of security from an absolute binary concept with only two
states {secure, insecure} to a service with continuous levels.
Therefore, end users of such security services must be equipped
with the facility to “measure” the quality of the provided service.
Based on such measurements, end users can make well-informed
decisions about how to utilize the security service at its current
level.
In the next section, we briefly survey the existing state-of-
the-art ad hoc key management framework designs, including
distributed PKI, distributed certificate chaining, and a hybrid
of the two. All relevant design choices that are affected by
situational factors are presented in detail.
III. KEY MANAGEMENT IN AD HOC NETWORKS
Current state-of-the-art ad hoc key management frameworks
can be classified into three categories: distributed PKI, distributed
certificate chaining, and hybrids of both. These approaches all
differ from each other in their assumptions about the network
environment, the type of trust relationships they build and rely
upon, the cost of maintenance, and many other categories. We
focus on the design properties that are relevant to the QoA they
provide. While there is more literature on the subject than covered
in this paper, we only discuss complete designs that provide
enough detail to be accurately evaluated.
A. Distributed PKI Approaches
To address the unique infrastructure-free nature of ad hoc
networks, several approaches have been proposed to provide the
functionality of public key infrastructure (PKI) [8] in a distributed
manner using threshold cryptography [10], [11], [20], [21], [23].
Wu et al. first suggest using threshold cryptography to distribute
the certificate authority (CA), the trusted entity in PKI, over
multiple nodes [20] and Zhou et al. propose the application to
ad hoc networks [23]. Kong et al. [11] and Yi et al. [21] follow
through with this approach by designing full key management
frameworks. In this paper, we only discuss these two concrete
designs.
The key parameters that can be used to distinguish between
different designs are the configuration parameters of threshold
cryptography:
• Total number of mobile nodes in the network: M,
• Number of distributed CA nodes: n,
• Crypto threshold: k.
All currently existing distributed PKI designs can be effec-
tively captured with these three parameters. A distributed PKI
configured with the parameters (M,n, k) can withstand up to
(n− k) faulty distributed CA nodes and is secure up to (k − 1)
compromised CA nodes. An end user must be able to contact at
least k CA nodes to receive a certification service.
In Kong et al.’s proposed solution, every mobile node in an ad
hoc network acts as a CA node and shares the responsibility of
the CA [11]. In other words, M = n and k << n. This approach
is tolerant to a very large number of non-malicious faulty CA
nodes due to the large gap between n and k. This approach also
provides very high availability because an end user has a large
pool of CA nodes to choose from. However, since it is equally
easy for an adversary to locate enough CA nodes to compromise,
the security of the framework can be easily compromised. Yi et
al. propose the MOCA key management framework [21]. Based
on their observations on the relationship between the fraction
of CA nodes in the network and the security of the framework,
they suggest that the fraction of CA nodes in the network should
be kept relatively small to maintain strong security. In other
words, n << M and k < n. However, the MOCA framework
suffers from less than perfect availability due to their security
enhancements. Essentially, Kong et al.’s approach sacrifices the
security of the framework to achieve ubiquitous availability and
MOCA sacrifices availability to achieve a high level of security.
Therefore, the impact of these design decisions must be integrated
into the end user’s perception of security. We examine Kong’s
approach and MOCA in greater detail in Section VI-C.
B. Certificate Chaining
Authentication by a chain of entities has commonly been used
in large scale distributed systems without a single authority or
in networks covering many administrative domains where it is
not simple to maintain a single trusted third party [9], [24]. In
general, authentication is represented as a chain of digital certifi-
cates. Certificate chaining does not require heavy infrastructure or
complex bootstrapping procedures and every node in certificate
chaining has identical roles and responsibilities. In certificate
chaining, any node can issue a certificate to any other node based
on its own discretion. Given the inherent peer-to-peer nature of
certificate chaining, it is easy to add new nodes into the system
to extend the coverage of the system. These characteristics of
certificate chaining make it a potential candidate for ad hoc key
management.
Capkun et al. propose a distributed variation of a certificate
chaining system [4]. Their design is a distributed version of a
PGP key server where each mobile node learns and stores a
portion of the PGP certificates issued in the network. When a
node wishes to authenticate another node, the two nodes merge
the contents of their local certificate storage and locate a chain of
certificates linking the two nodes. While Capkun et al. showed
that their distributed version can provide a comparable success
ratio, authentication in their approach suffers from the inherent
uncertainty in transitive trust. However, this characteristic of their
approach can only be seen when situational factors are consid-
ered. We examine Capkun’s design in detail in Section VI-D.
C. Hybrid Approaches
In their recent proposal, Yi et al. propose Composite Key
Management, a hybrid design of distributed PKI and certificate
chaining [22]. The main insight behind this design is to take ad-
vantage of the high quality authentication service from distributed
PKI as the anchor of trust and improve success ratio with easily
extensible coverage from certificate chaining. They propose a
trust relationship model to capture such hybrid approaches. As a
result, their model is more complicated than previous approaches
and this increased complexity amplify the need for the situation-
aware security paradigm. Also, their trust model is incomplete
since they did not provide a way to capture the security level
of the certificate authority. The metric of authentication Yi used
is very simple based on the use of a single certificate chain. It
is a well known fact that an authentication system based on a
single certificate chain can be easily manipulated [17]. Detailed
evaluation of this approach is presented in Section VI-E.
In the next section, we present our enhanced trust relationship
model that can capture all types of trust relationships formed by
various key management frameworks. The information captured
with our model is then processed using the situation-aware
MoA presented in Section V to produce the QoA values for
authentication services.
IV. MODELING TRUST RELATIONSHIPS
All authentication services for a distributed system are based
on the trust relationships among the entities in the system.
Therefore measuring the QoA of an authentication service must
begin with modeling these trust relationships. A natural choice of
a data structure for representing and capturing trust relationships
is a form of directed graph. Entities in a distributed system can
be modeled as vertices and trust relationships among them can
be captured as edges. Based on a large body of previous work
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in certificate chaining models [2], [3], [12], [18], [24] and some
more relevant approaches for ad hoc environments [21], [22],
we adopt a weighted directional graph structure called a Trust
Relationship Graph (TRG), TRG = {V,E}, where V is the set
of vertices representing the mobile nodes in the system and E
is the set of edges representing the trust relationships among the
mobile nodes. Each edge ei ∈ E has a weight function that
expresses a confidence value, which captures the amount of trust
that the issuer of the certificate has on the target. To avoid limiting
the applicability of the model, we allow any confidence value
between 0.0 (no trust) and 1.0 (absolute trust). For example, the
TRG of a typical certificate chaining system looks like Figure 3
where many certificates populate the TRG. It is important to
note that each client node in a network may have a differently
shaped local TRG based on their observations and knowledge.
As a client node collects more information and the local TRG
contains more information, the end user can put higher confidence
in the authentication result. We discuss this issue in detail in
Section V-C.
Yi et al. first proposed the idea of extending this trust graph
model to include trusted third parties, such as certificate au-
thorities [21]. Trust graphs for such systems generally look
like Figure 4. For distributed CA approaches, the CA node in
the graph represents the collection of nodes that comprises the
distributed CA. Since the confidence in authentication in a CA-
based system solely depends on the security of the CA, users
should be able to express their own perception of the security
of the CA. Yi suggested this idea of end users measuring the
security of a CA, but did not provide any details.
In this paper, we propose that the security level of a distributed
CA should be calculated based on the available situational
information. We define the CA’s security level as the probability
that an adversary can compromise the CA. This probability can
be calculated from the configuration parameters of the distributed
CA, including the total number of nodes in the network, M, the
number of CA nodes, n, and the crypto threshold, k (1 ≤ k ≤ n ≤
M ). In addition, each end user must provide the final parameter,
c, the capacity of the attacker(s), which represents a simple threat
model: there is one or more active and colluding attackers at a
given point of time and they are capable of compromising at
most c mobile nodes. If there are multiple independent attackers
that do not cooperate with each other, each attacker must be
given different c values depending on their capability. Each
end user must estimate c based on their perception of network
conditions and the behavior of the distributed CA. If c < k,
the threshold cryptography protects the distributed CA from
being compromised. However, if c ≥ k, the adversaries could
compromise enough nodes to break the threshold cryptography.
If the adversaries are capable of pinpointing the attacks on only
the CA nodes, the framework is always compromised as long as
c ≥ k. However, if the adversaries does not know the locations
or the identities of the n CA nodes, the best approach is to
compromise as many nodes as possible, hoping that it will allow
them to compromise at least k CA nodes, therefore compromising
the distributed CA. Given these assumptions, the security level
of a distributed CA can be calculated as:
CA Security Level = 1.0 −
P
c
i=k
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n
i
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´
`
M
c
´ . (1)
The second component of this equation captures the probability
that a distributed CA is compromised by an attacker with an
attack capacity c. The denominator,
(
M
c
)
, is the number of all
possible cases where the attackers compromises any c nodes in
a M-node network. The numerator counts the number of cases
where the attacker successfully compromises the distributed CA
by compromising k or more CA nodes ((n
i
)) and the rest from
non-CA nodes ((M−n
c−i
)). Hence, this second component repre-
sents the probability that an attacker or attackers can compromise
a distributed PKI by compromising c mobile nodes. Therefore,
Equation 1 captures the probability that the attacker fails to
compromise the CA or the CA resists the attack, and so the
CA’s security level. A more detailed analysis on this metric is
provided in Section VI-C.
Next, we present our situation-aware metrics of authentication
for calculating the QoA based on the TRG model presented in
this section and the relevant situational information.
V. METRICS OF AUTHENTICATION
Quality of Authentication (QoA) can be loosely defined as
the level of confidence that can be put on an instance of
authentication based on the current knowledge about the situation
of the authentication service. Once the trust relationships among
the nodes are captured, the QoA of each authentication instance
can be calculated using Metrics of Authentication (MoA) that
capture the effects of the current situational parameters. Given a
trust relationship graph of the network, TRG, the authenticating
node, a, and the target node, t, a function QoA(TRG, a, t)
returns a numeric value that represents the amount of trust the
authenticating node has in the authentication of the target node.
The design of our MoA is based on a large body of previous
research in authentication metrics [2], [3], [7], [9], [12], [15],
[18], [19], [24]. Our contributions include (1) a novel way to
measure the security level of distributed PKI approaches, (2)
a clean and intuitive method to combine multiple observations
in an authentication process, and (3) integration of situational
information into the QoA measurement. In the remainder of
this section, we first briefly compare two different types of
authentication supported in our MoA and then describe how to
evaluate the QoA in detail.
A. Direct vs. Indirect Authentication
It is important to distinguish between two types of authentica-
tion: direct and indirect. A direct authentication is achieved when
the authenticating node or the trusted third party has a direct trust
relationship with the target node (i.e., the target node possesses a
certificate issued by either the authenticating node or the trusted
third party). An indirect authentication is achieved via a chain of
certificates that originates at the authenticating node or the trusted
third party and ends at the target node. Indirect authentication
relies on the concept of transitive trust and is inherently less
trustworthy than direct authentication due to its reliance on other
nodes that the authenticating node does not have a direct trust
relationship with. Therefore, it is intuitive to favor trust from
direct authentication over any indirect authentication. QoA for
a direct authentication is defined as the confidence value of the
certificate issued to the target:
QoA(TRG,a, t) = c(ei),where ei = (a, t), ei ∈ E. (2)
When it is not possible to directly authenticate the target,
the authenticating node bases its decision on a combination
of all possible indirect authentications from the TRG. First,
the authenticating node locates as many node-disjoint certificate
chains as possible that link a and t. We do not allow two chains
to share an intermediate node to prevent a small number of
malicious nodes from corrupting a large number of certificate
chains. Reiter et al. present a nice discussion on this issue in
[17].
Given a certification graph, there may be many ways to select
a set of node-disjoint chains that have the same end nodes. It has
been shown that the problem of finding all node-disjoint paths in
a mesh graph is NP-hard [1]. Reiter also reports on the difficulty
of enforcing the node-disjoint property on chain discovery. There-
fore, in this paper, we employ a simple greedy approach for chain
discovery. The authenticating node, a, discovers any certificate
chain from either itself or the trusted third party (if available) to
the target node, t, in the local TRG. Finding a single certificate
chain can be achieved by running a breadth-first search algorithm
on the TRG. We use Dijkstra’s algorithm to find the shortest
chains available [6]. After calculating the confidence value of
the discovered chain, a removes the intermediate nodes of the
chain from the local TRG and repeats this process until there are
no more chains linking a and t. The confidence values from all
discovered chains are collected and then combined into a single
final QoA value at the end of the process. In the remainder of
this section, the QoA calculation for each indirect authentication
instance is presented in detail, as well as how these individual
QoA results can be combined into a final QoA.
B. Calculating the Chain Confidence Value for a Single Chain
For each certificate chain, the confidence value of the chain
must be calculated. Yi et al. propose a concise and intuitive
method for that purpose [22] that we adopt in this paper.
Given a certificate chain, there is a single Chain Confidence
Value (CCV) that is calculated from the edge confidence values
and the length of the chain. First, edge confidence values of all
of the edges in the chain are multiplied. Then, an attenuation
factor is multiplied to discourage the use of longer chains. Let
ei be the edges in the chain ci, c(ei) be the confidence value of
ei, p be the probability of a node being compromised, and d be
the length of the chain. The CCV is calculated as follows:
CCV (ci) =
Y
ei
c(ei) ∗ (1− p)
(d−1)
. (3)
Considering that the validity of a certificate chain relies on the
correctness of every participating node, it is intuitive to see that
a long certificate chain is more vulnerable and its use should be
discouraged if a shorter alternate is available. If we assume that
each node in the network is equally likely to be malicious or be
compromised with a probability p, the probability that a chain of
length d is intact can be denoted as (1 − p)(d−1) (not (1 − p)d
since the first hop is from a trusted node). To accommodate
this observation, the result from the multiplication of edge
confidence values is again multiplied by the attenuation factor,
(1 − p)(d−1). This attenuation factor decreases exponentially as
the chain length grows, which effectively discourages the use of
long chains. Yi et al.’s use of this user-tunable parameter p is
a good example of using situation-aware information in QoA
measurement where the end user’s perception of the network
condition (i.e., the fraction of compromised nodes) affects the
final QoA value.
When the discovered chain originates from a trusted third
party instead of the authenticating node, the trusted third party’s
security level is multiplied to get the final CCV:
CCV (ci) =
Y
ei
c(ei) ∗ (1− p)
(d−1)
∗ CA Security Level. (4)
C. Combining Chain Confidence Values from Multiple Chains
If multiple chains exist between two nodes, it is beneficial to
leverage information from all chains to make a more informed
decision about the trustworthiness of a particular node, increasing
the accuracy of the calculated QoA. Therefore, the final QoA
should be a function of the CCVs for the multiple chains. To
accomplish this task, there are two main steps. First, the CCVs
from the chains must be combined. Second, the quality of the
evidence given must be factored into the final decision of what
QoA to assign to the target.
Given a number of CCVs, the value of the mean (µ) is
calculated according to Equation 5, where q is the number of
chains.
µ =
P
CCV
q
. (5)
The probability that an accurate QoA is established by the
mean depends not only on the sample size, but also in the
variance between CCVs in the sample. Any CCVs that are far
outside the mean skew the result. To avoid the potential of
malicious nodes skewing the QoA by injecting a CCV at either
end of the spectrum, a confidence interval is used to eliminate
widely varying values. First, the sum of squares is calculated
according to Equation 6. Then, using this value, the standard
deviation (σ) is obtained according to Equation 7.
X
d
2 =
X
CCV
2
−
(
P
CCV )2
q
. (6)
σ =
sP
d2
q − 1
. (7)
Finally, any CCV values outside two standard deviations away
from the mean are removed from the sample and µ is recalculated
using the new sample using Equation 5.
Next, the level of confidence in the value of µ based on the
sample size is taken into account. Intuitively, a larger number
of chains should yield a higher confidence in µ than a lower
number of chains. Standard statistical methods for calculating
the probability that µ is correct assuming that the number of
possible samples is known ahead of time [14]. In other words,
if the possible number of samples is 100, we could calculate the
probability that µ is correct given 40 chains. However, the number
of possible chains cannot be not known due to the dynamic nature
of ad hoc networks, barring us from using the standard statistical
methods. To solve this problem, we turn to insights gained from
the study of Scientific Confirmation Theory, an area of inductive
logic [5], [14]. Essentially, we can think of the problem in the
following way. Given a set of the q CCV values, we want to make
a hypothesis about what the actual confidence value should be
based on these evidences. Using a standard approach in scientific
confirmation theory, we use Equation 8 to give the confidence
factor (ω), where q is the number of reporting chains.
ω =
q
q + 1
. (8)
Essentially, ω captures the level of confidence in the value of
µ given the fact that q chains are being used for the calculation.
The intuition behind Equation 8 is that the confidence in two
chains should be significantly higher than the confidence in only
one chain. However, the increase in confidence from 99 chains
to 100 chains should be quite small. This intuition is captured in
the confidence factor ω by doubling ω from one to two chains,
but only increasing ω by 1100 from 99 to 100 chains. Once ω is
determined from the sample size, it must be applied to µ to yield
the final QoA.
QoA = µ× ω. (9)
This final QoA value accommodates all existing information
in the authenticating node’s local TRG and therefore adequately
captures the authenticating node’s confidence in the target node.
Next, we apply our TRG model to various key management
frameworks and evaluate them using our QoA metric along with
success ratio measurements. Our experiments show surprisingly
vast differences between the quality of authentication services
provided by different key management frameworks and provide
some insights into the future design of ad hoc security services.
VI. EVALUATING KEY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS
Most previous research on ad hoc key management frameworks
has been evaluated with two metrics: success ratio and overhead.
While accurate overhead measurements can adequately express
the cost of using the given key management framework, success
ratio alone does not correctly show the impact of situational
factors on the utility of the framework. Yi et al. in their work on
Composite Key Management showed that there is a significant
difference between the quality of authentication between CA-
based PKIs and certificate chaining approaches [22]. Therefore,
a key management framework’s utility must be measured in
both dimensions: QoA and success ratio. Therefore, we use our
MoA to extensively study the QoA of existing key management
frameworks. While the focus of this study is the measurement of
QoA, we also measure the success ratio to provide a complete
evaluation. Additionally, we introduce a normalized QoA metric
that integrates QoA and success ratio, allowing for a compre-
hensive evaluation of overall performance. First, we present the
metrics of interest in more detail. Second, we discuss how the
experiments are set up to compare different designs of key
management frameworks. Based on both analytical and simulated
results, we evaluate existing key management frameworks includ-
ing two distributed PKI, one distributed certificate chaining, and
one hybrid approach.
A. Evaluation Criteria
The main focus of this study is QoA measurement. However,
measuring only QoA is no better than measuring success ratio
alone, as in most previous studies. Both QoA and success ratio
must be measured together for comprehensive evaluation of the
utility of key management frameworks.
Using the QoA metric presented in Section V, the QoA
Engines in the client nodes calculate the QoA for a single au-
thentication instance. To evaluate the quality of service provided
by a key management framework, we use the average QoA value
over all successful authentication instances, which separates out
the effect of unsuccessful authentications.
QoA(framework) =
P
QoA(Authentication Instance)
No. of Successful Authentications
.
(10)
In a distributed PKI approach, the QoA is simply the se-
curity level of the distributed CA since all authentications are
performed through the distributed CA. Therefore, the QoA of
a distributed PKI approach is calculated analytically based on
the configuration parameters from Equation 1. In a certificate
chaining approach, the QoA of each authentication depends on
the shape and contents of the local TRG of the authenticating
node, which depends on the operating conditions of the network.
Therefore, the QoA of a certificate chaining approach can only be
measured through extensive simulation by calculating the QoA
for all possible instances under varying conditions. For hybrid
approaches, both analytical measurements for the distributed PKI
component and simulation studies for the certificate chaining
component must be measured and combined.
Along with QoA, success ratio is another key metric to evaluate
the utility of a key management framework. Success Ratio is
defined as:
Success Ratio =
No. of Successful Authentication
No. of All Authentication Attempts
. (11)
In a distributed CA approach, a successful authentication is
achieved when the authenticating node successfully contacts the
distributed CA and receives a certification service. In other words,
success ratio for a distributed CA is defined by the the availability
of the CA, which depends on mobility, topology, and CA access
patterns in the network. We use the ns-2 network simulator to
measure the success ratio of distributed PKI approaches under
various scenarios.
For a certificate chaining approach, the success of authentica-
tion solely depends on the authenticating node’s local knowledge
about trust relationships in the network. In other words, the shape
and contents of the authenticating node’s local TRG determine
the success of an authentication attempt. The shape of a local
TRG depends on two factors: the shape of the global TRG
and the TRG distribution mechanism. If the global TRG does
not contain any chain linking the authenticating node and the
target node, authentication always fails. Even when there is a
certificate chain in the global TRG, an authentication can still
fail if the local TRG of the authenticating node does not contain
the relevant chain. Therefore, success ratios for a distributed
certificate chaining approach measure the effectiveness of the
TRG distribution mechanism. We generate a suite of global TRGs
and their matching set of local TRGs from mobility patterns
generated from the ns-2 network simulator.
In this way, it is possible to enforce the same mobility patterns
and network conditions on both distributed PKI and certificate
chaining approaches. For a hybrid approach, a successful au-
thentication can be provided with either the distributed PKI or
the certificate chaining component. We designed our experiments
to force the client nodes to first try to use the distributed PKI
service and fall back to certificate chaining only when PKI cannot
provide service since PKI provides higher quality authentications.
For a more intuitive comparison, we can combine the QoA
of a framework and the success ratio into a single metric called
Normalized QoA defined as:
Normalized QoA = QoA ∗ Success Ratio. (12)
Normalized QoA can be understood as the average QoA
of all authentication instances including both successful and
unsuccessful. Since normalized QoA includes success ratio, it
can only be calculated for a set of past authentication results and
not per authentication basis. However, normalized QoA embodies
the idea of situation-aware security by integrating all situational
impacts on authentication services and allows the network oper-
ators to understand the performance in a comprehensive manner.
B. Experiment Set-Up
To evaluate and compare different approaches, we use the
ns-2 network simulator and its mobility generator. The same
set of simulation parameters, including the number of mobile
nodes, the operating area of the network, the mobility patterns
of nodes, the authentication request patterns, and simulation time
are enforced across different approaches for fair comparison. In
all simulations, the test network contains 150 mobile nodes. Two
different simulation areas, of sizes 1500m x 500m and 3000m x
3000m, are used. In all cases, the network runs for 500 seconds
in simulation time before measurement begins. This warm-up
phase is to eliminate the effects of a network cold start and
also to give enough time for certificate chaining to “boot up”
so that TRGs can reach a stable state. The actual measurement
phase runs for another 1000 seconds in simulation time. Nodes’
movement follows the random-waypoint model with 10 seconds
pause time and varying maximum speed between 0 and 50 m/s.
C. Distributed PKI Approaches
Since all successful authentications in a PKI approach are
through the certificate authority and no other nodes, measurement
the QoA of distributed PKI approaches can be acquired by the
analytical calculation of the CA security level as presented in
Section V. The QoA Engine in a client node can calculate a
distributed CA’s security level based on its threshold cryptogra-
phy configuration. Since the CCV for a CA-based authentication
instance relies solely on the security level of the CA for the
confidence value as defined in Equation 4, the average QoA for a
distributed PKI approach is the average of the CA’s security level
observed by all end users in the system. In our simulation study,
we assume that all end users share the same perception of the
network status and have a single c value. The CA’s security level
presented in Equation 1 for the experimental settings behaves as
in Figure 5, which is based on the calculation with the example
crypto threshold k = 10. Given a fixed k, varying c or more
specifically varying the gap between k and c affects the CA’s
security level.
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In Figure 5, each curve shows different configurations of a
distributed PKI approach with varying number of CA nodes.
There are two important properties to note. First, each curve has
a sharp drop point where the CA’s security level drops from
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Fig. 6. Distributed PKI Approaches
a very high value close to 1.0 to a very low value close to
0.0. This means that the security of a distributed CA based on
threshold cryptography does not degrade gradually as attackers
become more capable, emphasizing the importance of picking the
right number of CA nodes depending on the operating conditions.
Second, the curves move to the left as the number of CA nodes
increases, showing that it is important to limit the number of CA
nodes to a small fraction. The leftmost line shows the case for
Kong’s approach (i.e., n = M = 150) where the security level
drops from 1.0 to 0.0 as soon as the attacker becomes capable of
compromising k nodes. Given this analysis of the security level of
general distributed PKI approaches, we next look at the success
ratio of specific approaches and its impact on the normalized
QoA.
1) Kong et al.’s Distributed CA: The success ratios for dis-
tributed PKI approaches are measured with ns-2 network simula-
tions where the authenticating nodes try to contact the distributed
CA when they need to authenticate another node. Since testing
all possible instances of authentication in 150-node networks re-
quires excessive amounts of time to simulate (22,500 certification
requests must be served), we use a random sampling to reduce
the amount of simulations to be performed. More specifically,
100 nodes are randomly selected and they each choose 50 other
random nodes and attempt to authenticate each of them in turn.
This test covers 5,000 authentication instances (around 22% of
all cases). We run five different mobility scenarios for each set
of simulation parameters and the results presented here are the
average from the five simulation runs. All results presented in
this section are from scenarios with attacker’s capacity c = 10
and crypto threshold k = 10. If c < k, the CA is protected by
the threshold cryptography. An adversary with a capacity c = k
is the least powerful attacker that can compromise the CA. We
assume that there is one such least powerful attacker in evaluation
of Kong’s scheme because Kong’s scheme becomes completely
vulnerable as long as c ≥ k and increasing the attacker’s capacity
beyond k (i.e., c > k) does not have any effect on the CA’s
security level.
Kong’s distributed PKI uses all mobile nodes in the network
as distributed CA nodes. Every node shares a piece of the CA’s
secret key and can participate in providing authentication service.
In our experiments, the total number of mobile nodes is fixed to
150, as is the number of CA nodes, by design. Various crypto
threshold values, k = 1, 5, 10, 20, 30, have been tested. Intuitively,
a higher k value should decrease the success ratio and improve the
security of the distributed CA. However, this effect is not seen in
Kong’s design since (1) success ratio is always maintained very
high due to their design decisions to use all mobile nodes as CA
nodes, and (2) the security level of Kong’s CA is constantly
low as long as the attacker’s capacity, c, exceeds the crypto
threshold k. Figures 6 (a) and (b) each show QoA, success
ratio, and normalized QoA for 1500m x 500m and 3000m x
3000m test area. Even though the test area in the second case is
considerably larger, resulting in a much lower node density, the
success ratio of Kong’s distributed CA still remains high. This
is due to the high redundancy of CA nodes. However, the same
design choice makes it very easy to compromise the distributed
CA as long as the attacker is powerful enough. The attacker
can always compromise Kong’s framework, which yields the CA
security level close to zero, resulting in very low QoA values.
As a result, the normalized QoA is heavily affected by the low
QoA and also remains very low. In summary, Kong’s approach is
an example where the quality of security is sacrificed to provide
perfect availability. This design decision is captured by applying
the situational information and can now be exposed to end users.
2) MOCA: Yi et al. propose the MOCA distributed PKI as a
secure distributed PKI solution. They enhance the security of the
distributed CA by limiting the number of CA nodes to a relatively
small fraction while hiding their identities so that attackers cannot
focus their attack resources on the CA nodes. Also, the CA nodes
in MOCA are selected based on their node characteristics so that
they can resist potential attacks. Since their proposed routing
layer solution for anonymous communication is not immune to
traffic analysis, there is a chance that the identities of some CA
nodes are revealed to the attackers. If an end user is aware of
this, the end user can reduce the k accordingly to reflect the
changing situation. In our experiments, we tested with varying
numbers of CAs, between 15 and 50, which are respectively 10%
and 33% of the total mobile nodes. In this section, we present a
case with n = 30 where 20% of the mobile nodes in the network
are selected as distributed CA nodes. Results presented here use
the fixed values of crypto threshold k = 10, and the attacker’s
capacity c = 10 for a fair comparison with Kong’s scheme. In
MOCA, as the attacker grows stronger (i.e., with larger c), the
CA’s security level stays high much longer and then degrades
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Fig. 7. Certificate Chaining Approaches
gracefully compared to Kong’s scheme.
In both Figures 6 (c) and (d), the security of the MOCA
framework is maintained high, very close to 1.0. This shows
the effect of the design choices to enhance the security of the
distributed CA. However, the price for maintaining such a high
level of security is shown in the success ratio in both graphs.
In Figure 6 (c), the success ratio gradually degrades from 92%
to 45% as the mobility in the network increases. While 45%
success ratio under the extreme mobility of 50 m/s does not
seem too bad, the effect on success ratio is more amplified in
Figure 6 (d), where the node density is considerably lower than
Figure 6 (c), which causes more difficulty to contact the required
number of distributed CA nodes. The success ratio in Figure 6 (d)
degrades from 85% to 17%. In the MOCA framework, the
success ratio dominates the normalized QoA since it provides
a very high QoA constantly with varying success ratios. MOCA
is an example where the authors first achieve very strong security
of the framework and provide best-achievable communication
support for the given availability, demonstrating the applicability
of the Situation-Aware Security paradigm.
D. Certificate Chaining Approaches
Measurement of QoA for certificate chaining is based on
the contents of the local TRG of authenticating nodes at the
time of the authentication attempt. If the authenticating node
has more information (or a larger portion of the global TRG),
both QoA and the success ratio improve. The success ratio of
certificate chaining again depends on the snapshot of the local
TRG of the authenticating node at the time of the authentication
attempt. Since the best achievable QoA and the success ratio
of distributed certificate chaining are limited by the shape of
the global TRG, we first simulate the ideal case where every
mobile node has perfect knowledge of the trust relationships in
the network and compare the results with a distributed certificate
chaining mechanism proposed by Capkun et al. [4].
To compare certificate chaining with distributed PKI ap-
proaches, we enforced the same mobility patterns and network
settings for both simulations. Based on the mobility log from
each 1000-second simulation run, we populate the global trust
relationship graph by adding an edge when a node is in com-
munication range of another node for more than one minute.
This is to simulate the time to identify each other, collect
relevant data from each other, and issue certificates with a full
confidence value of 1.0 to each other. This results in best-case
scenarios for certificate chaining where every trust relationship
is bidirectional (which is not always true in reality) and has the
maximum level of confidence. In a way, we are creating the best-
possible scenarios for certificate chaining that generate the upper-
bound for QoA and success ratio. We show next that even with
these strong assumptions, certificate chaining can only provide
marginal performance due to its inherent dependence on transitive
trust.
1) Using the Global Trust Relationship Graph: The first set of
results for certificate chaining is from the ideal case where every
mobile node has perfect knowledge about the global TRG. After
generating the global TRG during the 1000-second simulation
run, authentications between every pair of nodes is performed
using the global TRG. Both QoA and success ratio improve in
Figures 7 (a) and (b) as mobility increases. This is due to the
increased number of nodes that a mobile node encounters as
they move faster. Since a denser TRG contains more certificates
chains, both QoA and success ratio are improved. Unlike the
cases with distributed PKI approaches where either success ratio
or QoA dominates the effect on normalized QoA, the normalized
QoA of certificate chaining is affected by both. Normalized QoA
also improves as mobility grows due to the improvement in both
success ratio and QoA.
2) Distributed Certificate Chaining by Capkun et al.: Capkun
et al. proposed a distributed version of certificate chaining
without having a centralized component that stores the global
TRG [4]. Basically, each mobile node carries a subgraph of
the global TRG and nodes enhance their knowledge as they
encounter more nodes. We use the same method as in the global
TRG test where each mobile node generates their local TRG
during the 1000-second simulations runs according to the scheme
proposed in the paper. Then, each node attempts to authenticate
every other node in the network only using the local TRG. As
shown in Figure 7 (c), Capkun’s distributed version provides a
comparable success ratio to using the global TRG in all ranges
as shown in their original paper. However, since each mobile
node has less than perfect knowledge about the global TRG,
many authentication instances based on the local TRG use longer
certificate chains, resulting in the lower overall QoA values. This
effect is even more clearly amplified in Figure 7 (d) where the
node density is much lower and the mobile nodes are challenged
to gather enough information about the global trust relationships.
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Fig. 8. Composite Key Management by Yi et al.
The success ratio in Figure 7 (d) also shows the effect of
imperfect knowledge caused by the distribution of the TRG.
Normalized QoA shows this degradation of performance in
an amplified view since the effect from imperfect knowledge
is represented twice through success ratio and QoA. These re-
sults again emphasize the importance of situation-aware security
where the quality of security must be constantly monitored since
a naive comparison of success ratios alone does not clearly
demonstrate the difference between authentications based on
global knowledge and partial knowledge.
E. Hybrid Approaches
Yi et al. proposed a hybrid approach that deploys their previous
work on distributed PKI, the MOCA distributed PKI, and a
form of distributed certificate chaining simultaneously [22]. They
reported to have achieved both high success ratio and high
QoA using their own metric. As shown in Figure 8 (a), Yi et
al.’s composite key management achieves a very high success
ratio while maintaining a very high QoA. However, under more
challenging scenarios in Figure 8 (b), while success ratio is still
maintained at relatively high levels, the quality of authentication
starts to degrade as the distributed CA becomes unavailable and
mobile nodes become challenged to maintain their local TRG.
Normalized QoA for the first set stays very close 1.0, showing
almost perfect quality of security. However, under more challeng-
ing conditions, normalized QoA drops down to 0.45, showing that
even this hybrid approach, which is specifically designed for ad
hoc environments, cannot always provide perfect security. This
observation again emphasizes the need for situation-awareness
where the fluctuations in the quality of provided security is
constantly monitored and conveyed to the end users.
F. Summary
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Fig. 9. Performance Summary of Ad Hoc Key Management Frameworks
Figure 9 summarizes the various ad hoc key management
frameworks evaluated in this study using a two dimensional chart.
In general, it is better to be close to the ideal performance
point represented as the black square. Also, a smaller range,
both in success ratio and QoA, means more constant results,
while a larger range represents more variance in the quality of
the provided service. It is clear that previous approaches that
only evaluate success ratio are not enough to effectively compare
different designs. Success ratios from all examined frameworks
overlap each other and it is unclear how to compare their perfor-
mance based on success ratio only. While Kong’s approach stands
out with the highest success ratio under all conditions, QoA
measurements reveal the low QoA it provides. The performance
of certificate chaining and distributed certificate chaining varies
over a large range of success ratios and QoA, which suggests that
they might not be a good choice for scenarios that require more
predictable authentication services. MOCA provides constantly
high QoA with varying success ratio, which can be a good
solution for environments where the quality of authentication
matters more than high availability of the authentication service.
Composite Key Management provides the best performance in
both success ratio and QoA and the small coverage area shows a
more consistent level of service. However, even Composite Key
Management cannot provide perfect service under challenging
conditions. Efforts to measure the changing quality of security
under varying conditions and conveying the results to end users
in an intuitive manner must be parallel to the efforts to designing
better-suited security services for ad hoc environments. QoA
measurement completes the comprehensive evaluation of ad hoc
key management frameworks and can be used as an effective
guide for future designs.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose the concept of Situation-Aware
Security where a security service is designed to provide the
best-achievable security and the clients of such security services
are informed of the changing levels of the currently provided
security service. We apply this new paradigm to the authen-
tication service provided by key management frameworks. We
propose the Quality of Authentication metric and test existing
key management frameworks. The results show that various
key management frameworks provide drastically different QoA,
which strengthens our argument that any effective security service
for ad hoc environments must be designed around the quality of
the provided service based on situational information.
Currently, we are investigating other types of ad hoc security
services that can benefit from situation-awareness, including
secure routing and anonymous routing. There are also some
inherently best-effort security services designed for wired net-
works, such as PGP, which can easily be augmented with support
for situation-awareness. Situation-aware security presents an
interesting challenge. Constant measurement of the quality of
a security service must be conveyed to end users. Therefore,
the form in which the measurements are conveyed must be
concise and intuitive so that an end user can act upon the
information. We plan to continue our investigation in this user-
interface issue along the newly emerging security-HCI (Human
Computer Interaction) research efforts.
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